In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. First, we show an impossibility result: Even when school priorities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is no robustly stable mechanism. Our main result characterizes the market conditions under which a robustly stable mechanism exists. Specifically, we show that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin, 2002) , and in that case, the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique robustly stable mechanism.
Introduction
Matching theory has influenced the design of labor markets and student assignment systems.
1 Stability plays a central role in the theory: A matching is stable if there is no individual agent who prefers being unmatched to being assigned to her allocation in the matching, and there is no pair of agents who prefer being assigned to each other to being assigned to their respective allocations in the matching. In real-world applications, empirical studies have shown that stable mechanisms often succeed whereas unstable ones often fail.
2
In recent years, the incentive properties of stable mechanisms have attracted much attention. Roth (1982) shows that any stable mechanism is manipulable. However, if preferences of one side of the market are common knowledge, as in school choice (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where school priorities are exogenously given by law, the student-optimal stable mechanism is both strategy-proof and stable (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) . Indeed, the student-optimal stable mechanism has been adopted in practical assignment problems, such as student assignment in New York City and Boston and the National Resident Matching Program.
However, most existing analysis has overlooked other types of of manipulation, as stability and strategy-proofness have been studied separately. If agents are capable of misreporting their preferences during the centralized matching process and also rematching (blocking) after the matching is announced, then they may be able to use the combination of these manipulations to their advantage. Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2009) consider the combination of these manipulations and propose a strong stability concept requiring robustness against these manipulations in a matching problem with interdependent values.
3 Adapting their concept to the standard matching model without interdependent values, we say that a mechanism is robustly stable if no student is made strictly better off by a combined manipulation of misreporting preferences and rematching.
Although this departure from the standard concepts may seem small, it has very different implications on the design of matching mechanisms. First, we demonstrate that, even when school priorities are exogenously given and only students can behave strategically, there is no robustly stable mechanism in general.
Given the above impossibility theorem, a natural question is what conditions allow for a robustly stable mechanism. Our main result characterizes the existence of a robustly stable mechanism in terms of the priority structure of schools. More specifically, we show that there is a robustly stable mechanism in a market if and only if the priority structure of schools in that market is acyclic (Ergin, 2002) . Moreover, if there is a robustly stable mechanism, then it coincides with the student-optimal stable mechanism.
The analysis of this paper suggests that one cannot expect complete elimination of manipulations even when only students can act strategically. If the social planner can influence the priority structure, as in the case of student placement in public schools, the theory suggests that acyclicity is likely to make the system immune to manipulations. However, acyclicity is a very demanding condition, and so this paper suggests that robust stability is hard to guarantee, even when the social planner can influence the priority structure to some extent.
At this point we comment on a conceptual issue. The model assumes that school priorities are publicly known. Publicly known school priorities arise naturally in the school choice setting: As Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) point out, school priorities are exogenously given by law in many school districts. In such a case, however, one might argue that schools are not strategic players and hence do not participate in rematching, so combined manipulations are unimportant and instead stability and strategy-proofness are sufficient. Even in school choice, however, robust stability may be important. For instance, consider the appeals process. In student placement to high schools in New York City, many students participate in an appeals process to be assigned to a school they like better than their prescribed assignment (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005, 2009) . For the academic year [2003] [2004] , the first year when the student-optimal stable mechanism was implemented there, more than 5,000 students appealed their assignments, and about 300 appeals were from students who received their stated first choices.
4 The Department of Education granted about half of the appeals. This suggests that students may be able to engage in rematching even in the school choice setting.
5 Another possible interpretation is a model of labor markets where preferences of one side of the market are publicly known. In labor markets, it is natural to assume that both sides may engage in rematching. In this context, the assumption that preferences of one side of the market are publicly known simplifies the analysis and helps illuminate the consequence of the new stability concept.
The next section presents the model and the results. The relation to the literature will be discussed after the main result of the paper.
Model and Results
A matching problem is tuple (S, C, P, , q). S and C are finite and disjoint sets of students and schools. For each student s ∈ S, P s is a strict preference relation over C and being unmatched (denoted by ∅). We write cR s c (where c, c ∈ C ∪ {∅}) if either cP s c or c = c . For each school c ∈ C, c is a priority, which is a strict, complete and transitive binary relation over S and being unmatched, ∅. We write = ( c ) c∈C . For each c ∈ C, q c is the quota of c. A matching is a vector µ = (µ s ) s∈S assigning a seat at school µ s ∈ C or ∅ to each student s, with seats in each school c assigned to at most q c students. We write µ c = {s ∈ S|µ s = c} for the set of students who are assigned seats at school c. The set of a student's possible preferences is denoted by P.
We say that matching µ is blocked by (s, c) ∈ S × C if cP s µ s and either (1) |µ c | < q c and s c ∅ or (2) |µ c | = q c , s c ∅ and s c s for some s ∈ µ c . A matching µ is individually rational if µ s P s ∅ for every s ∈ S and |µ c | ≤ q c and s c ∅ for all s ∈ µ c . A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and is not blocked. As we are primarily interested in the school choice problem, we assume s c ∅ for all s ∈ S and c ∈ C for simplicity.
We refer to a tuple (S, C, , q) as a market and consider a situation where only student preferences are private information while the market (S, C, , q) is given. A mechanism is a function ϕ from P |S| to the set of all matchings. Mechanism ϕ is stable if ϕ(P ) is a stable matching for every P ∈ P |S| . Mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if ϕ s (P )R s ϕ s (P s , P −s ) for every P ∈ P |S| , s ∈ S and P s ∈ P. Note that we only allow students to report preferences; school priorities are publicly known.
6 This assumption simplifies the analysis and helps illuminate the consequences of the stability concept of this paper. Publicly known school priorities arise naturally in the school choice setting: As Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) point out, school priorities are exogenously given by law in many school districts. A similar approach is taken by Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2009) . Definition 1. A mechanism ϕ is robustly stable if the following conditions are satisfied.
6 There is a rich literature on strategic behavior when preferences of both sides of the market are private information. Roth (1982) shows there is no stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for all agents on both sides. Sönmez (1997 Sönmez ( , 1999 show other forms of manipulations are unavoidable for stable mechanisms. Meanwhile, Kojima and Pathak (2008) show that manipulations become increasingly difficult as the size of the market becomes large.
(1) ϕ is stable, (2) ϕ is strategy-proof, and (3) there exist no s ∈ S, c ∈ C, P ∈ P |S| and P s ∈ P such that (i) cP s ϕ s (P ), (ii) s c ∅ and (iii) s c s for some s ∈ ϕ c (P s , P −s ) or |ϕ c (P s , P −s )| < q c .
In words, a mechanism is robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof and also immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misrepresents his or her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the centralized mechanism. Condition (3) is the additional requirement over the combination of stability and strategy-proofness, and it plays a central role in our analysis. To the best of our knowledge, Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2009) are the first to consider this combined manipulation in two-sided matching.
7 They consider a Bayesian game of matching with interdependent values in which a player can both misreport in the matching process and rematch afterwards. They say that a mechanism is stable if there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all players report their signals truthfully and all players accept their assigned partners on the equilibrium path. Although the direct comparison is somewhat subtle because of modeling differences, the robust stability concept defined here is conceptually close to and is motivated by the stability concept employed by Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2009) .
As mentioned in the introduction, one specific context in which robust stability may arise as a natural stability concept is a student placement process with appeals. For example, many students in New York City participate in an appeals process to be assigned to a school they prefer to their prescribed assignment (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005, 2009 ). For the academic year 2003-2004, more than 5,000 students appealed their assignment and about 300 appeals were from students who received their stated first choices. The Department of Education granted about half the appeals, suggesting that students may be able to engage in rematching even in the school choice setting.
Given P , the following student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm produces a stable matching ϕ S (P ) (Gale and Shapley, 1962 ).
•
Step 1: Each student applies to her first choice school (if any). Each school rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity and all unacceptable students among those who applied to it, keeping the rest of the students temporarily (so students not rejected at this step may be rejected in later steps.)
In general,
•
Step t: Each student who was rejected in Step (t-1) applies to her next highest acceptable choice, if any. Each school considers these students and students temporarily held from the previous step together, and rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity and all unacceptable students, keeping the rest of the students temporarily (so students not rejected at this step may be rejected in later steps.)
The algorithm terminates when no one applies to a school. Each student tentatively accepted by a school at the last step is allocated a seat at that school. The student-optimal stable mechanism is a mechanism ϕ S that produces ϕ S (P ) for every P ∈ P |S| . It is well known that ϕ S is stable (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) . The following example demonstrates, however, that ϕ S is not immune to the combination of these two kinds of manipulations even though it is immune to each of them separately.
Example 1. Consider a problem with S = {1, 2, 3}, C = {a, b}, and
Under the true preferences P = (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), the student-optimal stable mechanism ϕ S produces ϕ S (P ) = (ϕ
. Now consider a false preference P 2 of student 2, P 2 : ∅. Then, under P = (P 2 , P −2 ), ϕ S produces ϕ S (P ) = (b, ∅, a). Since aP 2 ∅ = ϕ S 2 (P ) and 2 a 3 ∈ ϕ S a (P ), ϕ S is not robustly stable: More specifically, student 2 has incentives to first report P 2 and then block ϕ S (P ), violating condition (3) of the definition of robust stability.
Since ϕ S is the only mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof, by Example 1 we have just proved the following impossibility result. Theorem 1. There exists no mechanism that is robustly stable for all markets.
The next question to ask is whether we can say a mechanism is robustly stable in a specific market. In other words, we investigate conditions on a pair ( , q), called a priority structure, under which the mechanism is robustly stable. The following concept will prove useful.
Definition 2 (Ergin (2002) ). Let ( , q) be a priority structure. A cycle is a, b ∈ C, i, j, k ∈ S such that
• i a j a k a ∅ and k b i b ∅, and
• There exist disjoint sets of students S a , S b ⊂ S \ {i, j, k} such that
A priority structure ( , q) is acyclic if there exists no cycle.
With the above notion, we can now present our main result, which is a characterization of markets in which a robustly stable mechanism exists. Theorem 2. For market (S, C, , q), the following statements are equivalent.
(1) There exists a robustly stable mechanism.
(2) ϕ S is robustly stable.
(3) The priority structure ( , q) is acyclic.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorems 1 and 2 suggest that manipulations may be unavoidable even when only students can act strategically. If the social planner can influence the priority structure, as in the case of student placement in public schools, the theory suggests that acyclicity would make the system immune to manipulations. This point of view is shared by a number of studies, from related but different aspects. Ergin (2002) shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if the priority structure is acyclic.
8 Haeringer and Klijn (2007) show that, in the school choice setting,
8 In Ergin's work, group strategy-proofness means that no group of students can misreport preferences jointly and make some of its members strictly better off without making any of its members strictly worse off. When the priority structure is not acyclic, only a weaker version of group strategy-proofness holds. That is, no group of students can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. This latter result is first shown by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and extended by Martinez, Masso, Neme, and Oviedo (2004) , and Kojima (2007, 2008 ) to matching problems with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) . the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes under the student-optimal stable mechanism (possibly with constraints on the length of rank order lists) coincides with the set of stable matchings if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Kesten (2008) shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is immune to capacity manipulation (Sönmez, 1997) if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic. Kesten (2006) introduces a slightly stronger acyclicity concept and shows that the top trading cycles mechanism coincides with the student-optimal stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure satisfies his version of acyclicity. The concept of acyclicity has been generalized to coarse priorities and acceptant and substitutable priorities (as defined by Kojima and Manea (2009) ) by Ehlers and Erdil (2009) and Kumano (2009) , respectively.
9
An important related paper is Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2009). They consider a matching market with interdependent values and introduce a stability concept with the possibility of combined manipulations. In that environment, they establish impossibility theorems which assert that there is no stable mechanism in their sense. Meanwhile they also note that their impossibility theorems can be obtained even with a weaker notion of stability, namely the combination of traditional stability and strategy-proofness as required separately. The current study complements their study by showing that there exists no robustly stable mechanism even if there is no interdependent value component, and then characterizing the condition necessary and sufficient for the existence of a robustly stable mechanism. Note that our characterization result critically depends on the assumption of private values. With interdependent values, Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2009) show the impossibility of stable mechanisms even when the priority structure is acyclic, so our private values assumption is important in Theorem 2.
Finally, we note that this study is part of the active literature on incentive compatibility in student placement mechanisms. Erdil and Ergin (2006) and Kesten (2009) propose mechanisms that produce more efficient student placements than the currently used mechanisms in New York City and Boston, but they also show these mechanisms are not strategy-proof. More generally, there is no strategy-proof mechanism that Pareto dominates the student-optimal stable mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth, 2009) . When there are no priorities, as in part of New York City's assignment process, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ) is more efficient than the current random priority mechanism, but the former mechanism is not strategy-proof. Pathak (2006) observes that the efficiency gain of the probabilistic serial mechanism seems small in the New York City data, and supports the random priority mechanism as an appropriate market design.
10 Kojima and Manea (2008) , on the other hand, show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is incentive compatible when the number of seats in each school is sufficiently large. Che and Kojima (2009) subsequently show that these two mechanisms are asymptotically equivalent as the market becomes infinitely large.
Conclusion
This paper introduced a new stability concept, robust stability. Theorem 1 demonstrates that there is no robustly stable mechanism. This result suggests that one cannot eliminate manipulations completely even when agents on only one side of the market have private information. On the other hand, Theorem 2 characterizes the market structures that enable robustly stable mechanisms to exist. If the social planner can design the priority structure, as in the case of student placement to public schools, the theory suggests that acyclicity is likely to make the system robust to manipulations. However acyclicity is a very demanding condition, so one possible way to read this paper is to say robust stability is not only impossible for arbitrary markets (Theorem 1), but also is hard to guarantee by judiciously specifying a priority structure (Theorem 2).
The extant literature has also found acyclic priority structures to be key in producing desirable properties in matching markets. Papers cited in the Introduction are only a few examples. This paper identifies one more sense in which such a structure proves critical for the design of matching markets. We envision that investigating further implications of priority structures may be a fruitful direction of future research.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
We say that mechanism ϕ is nonbossy if ϕ s (P s , P −s ) = ϕ s (P ) implies ϕ(P s , P −s ) = ϕ(P ). The following result proves useful.
Result 1 (Ergin (2002) ). Mechanism ϕ S is nonbossy for market (S, C, , q) if and only if ( , q) is acyclic. 11 Part of Theorem 2 of Ergin (2002) states that ϕ S is group strategy-proof if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Result 1 follows from the following two well-known Now we proceed to the proof. We will show (1) ⇐⇒ (2), (2) =⇒ (3) and (3) =⇒ (2), in this order.
(1) ⇐⇒ (2) Condition (2) obviously implies condition (1). Since the only stable mechanism that is strategy-proof is ϕ S , it is also obvious that condition (1) implies condition (2).
(2) =⇒ (3) We show the claim by contraposition. Suppose that the priority structure is not acyclic. Then, by definition, there exist a, b ∈ C, i, j, k ∈ S such that
Consider the following preferences of students:
It is easy to see that ϕ S j (P ) = ∅. Now consider a false preference of student j, P j : ∅. We write P = (P j , P −j ). Then ϕ S k (P ) = a. Since aP j ∅ = ϕ S j (P ) and j a k ∈ ϕ S a (P ), ϕ S is not robustly stable.
(3) =⇒ (2) We show the claim by contradiction. To this end, suppose that ( , q) is acyclic but ϕ S is not robustly stable. Since ϕ S is stable and strategy-proof, this assumption implies that Condition (A): there exist s ∈ S, c ∈ C, P ∈ P |S| and P s ∈ P such that (i) cP s ϕ S s (P ), (ii) s c ∅ and (iii) s c s for some s ∈ ϕ S c (P s , P −s ) or |ϕ S c (P s , P −s )| < q c .
Letting P = (P s , P −s ), we consider the following cases.
facts: (i) ϕ S is strategy-proof for any priority structure, and (ii) a mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is both strategy-proof and nonbossy.
(1) Suppose ϕ S s (P ) = ∅. Let P s : c, ∅ and P = (P s , P −s ). (a) Suppose ϕ S s (P ) = ∅. Then, by definition of P s we have c P s ϕ S s (P ).
Moreover, since ( , q) is acyclic by assumption and hence ϕ S is nonbossy by Result 1, we have ϕ S (P ) = ϕ S (P ). This property and Condition (A) imply that either s c s for some s ∈ ϕ and P = (P s , P −s ). By the well-known comparative statics by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Gale and Sotomayor (1985) , |ϕ 
